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Abstract

Since its introduction by Tuckman and Chang (Nonprofit Volunt Sector Q 20(4):445-460, 1991), the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) has been widely adopted into the nonprofit literature as a precise
measure of revenue concentration. This widespread adoption has been characterized by diverse
composition, with the HHI's calculation being largely determined by the nature of the available data
and the degree to which it contained disaggregated measures of revenue. Using the NCCS 990 Digitized
Data, we perform an acid test on whether different HHI measures yield significantly different results.
Four measures of revenue concentration--an aggregated measure based on three revenue streams, an
aggregated measure separating government grants from other contributions, a more nuanced
measure based on seven revenue streams, and a fully disaggregated measure based on thirteen
revenue streams--are used to predict two dominant nonprofit financial health dimensions: financial
volatility and financial capacity. Overall, our results show that aggregation in HHI measurement
matters; aggregation often downplays relationships by influencing the significance levels and
magnitudes of estimates in a non-trivial way.
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Introduction

Researchers have captured revenue diversification by calculating a Hirschman Herndahl Index (HHI). Its
calculation has largely been determined by the nature of the available data and the degree to which it
contained disaggregated measures of revenue. To that effect, the HHI calculation has included varying
counts of revenue streams ranging from three, four, five, eleven, and thirteen, to as many as nineteen.
Given its high degree of adoption and use in nonprofit research, this paper seeks to perform an acid
test on whether the way the revenue diversification is calculated, that is, whether one uses more
aggregated measures (three or four revenue streams) or more disaggregated measures (seven or
thirteen revenue streams), influences the results in important ways. In other words, how sensitive is
the Hirschman Herndahl Index when it is calculated using different counts of revenue aggregations?
The concern here is that with aggregation, important information is lost -- information that can
potentially alter estimations and predictions in non-trivial ways.

Hirschman-Herndahl Index: Paternity and Adoption

Independently posited by both Hirschman (1945, 1964) and Herndahl (1950) as a measure of trade and
industry concentration or inequality, the HHI has been used in the calculation of concentration across
various contexts, ranging from household wealth or income, merger analysis, rm outputs (Rhoades
1993), to revenue concentration in both the public (e.g., Suyderhoud 1994) and nonprofit sectors (e.g.,
Calabrese 2011; Carroll and Stater 2009; Chang and Tuckman 1994; Chikoto and Neely 2014; Mayer et
al. 2012; Tuckman and Chang 1991; Yan et al. 2009). The HHI is therefore regarded as a precise
measure of concentration that takes into account the number of revenue streams and the distribution
amongst them.

Since its introduction into the nonprofit literature by Tuckman and Chang (1991), there has been a
widespread adoption of the HHI. For instance, a basic google scholar search of the words revenue
diversification AND nonprofit yields about 17,100 records where the words revenue, diversification,
and nonprofit have been used or referenced within a single record. Alternatively, the word search of
revenue concentration AND nonprofit yields 27,500 records. Bottom line; the topic of revenue
diversification or its inverse, revenue concentration, has been and continues to be of keen interest to
the study of nonprofit organizations financial environments (Chang and Tuckman 2010). Generally, the
strategy of revenue diversification has been positively associated with financial stability (Carroll and
Stater 2009; Greenlee and Trussel 2000; Hager 2001; Keating et al. 2005; Thomas and Trafford 2013;
Trussel 2002; Tuckman and Chang 1991), and negatively associated with financial capacity building
(Chikoto and Neely 2014; Faulk 2010; Foster and Fine 2007). As a result, various recommendations to
nonprofit organizations have ensued surrounding revenue diversification and concentration.
The HHIs widespread adoption as a measure of revenue diversification has also been characterized by
wide composition. As a function of data availability (e.g., National Center for Charitable Statistic (NCCS)
Core 990 Data versus NCCS Digitized Data), U.S.-based nonprofit researchers have tended to rely on
three aggregated revenue sources - donative, earned, and investment income to calculate the HHI
(e.g., Carroll and Stater 2009; Keating et al. 2005; Frumkin and Keating 2002). Others have used four
revenue streams - donative income, earned income, government grants, and investment income (e.g.,
Yan et al. 2009); with some using five revenue sources very different from those used in Tuckman and
Chang (1991) public support, program service revenues, dues and assessments, net fundraising
income, and profits from the sale of inventory (e.g., Hager 2001).
Where more comprehensive data was available, a handful of researchers have measured revenue
diversification using more disaggregated revenue streams, ranging from as many as eleven (Calabrese
2011), thirteen streams (Chikoto and Neely 2014), to nineteen revenue streams (Wicker and Breuer
2013). Piquing our interest is that, although not the centerpiece of Chikoto and Neelys (2014) research,
in their review of whether revenue concentration promoted nonprofit financial capacity growth, the
authors observed that as the HHI became more comprehensive (calculated using three, four, or
thirteen revenue streams), the coefficients on their financial capacity growth measures increasingly
became more positive.
Bear in mind that, grounded in Markowitzs (1952) financial portfolio theory, revenue diversification is a
risk reduction strategy that is based on the differential levels of volatility associated with each revenue
stream. Furthermore, each funding stream generally requires different solicitation and fundraising
competencies. In light of all of the above, this research uses the NCCS 990 Digitized Data to test
whether different HHI measures significantly predict different levels of financial volatility (a measure of
stability) and financial capacity (a measure of growth) two thematic areas that have dominated
nonprofit research (Bowman 2011).

Aggregation and Information Loss

Nonprofit financing can be classified into varying macro and micro categories such as donations or
contributions (as represented in the 990 form), which when disaggregated, may include donations
from individual and from institutions like foundations, as well as government grants. Hence, the

contributions variable would represent a reduced funding stream at the macro-level. In the same vein,
government funding, includes funding from federal, state, and local government, which in turn can be
disaggregated into grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements (Kerlin 2006), among other forms all of which behave differently (Young 2006) and may generate different behaviors from nonprofit
recipients of such funding (Chikoto 2015; Chikoto 2007; Kelman 2002; Kerlin 2006; Salamon 2002).
The NCCS is a key source of data for studying nonprofits in the United States. Unless digitized, its
datasets generally aggregate funding from individuals (from charitable donations, bequests, and other
fundraising initiatives), foundations (independent and corporate), and government grants under one
category of contributions. But in reality, each of these funding sources requires different fundraising
and grant making techniques to acquire as they are influenced by diverse motivations and factors and
hence, may impose diverse opportunities, demands, and restrictions on nonprofit organizations (see
Chikoto 2015; Cordes and Sansing 2006; Rooney 2006; Rushton and Brooks 2006). In addition, each
one of these sources might be subjected to unique volatility (Foster and Fine 2007; Froelich 1999;
Mayer et al. 2012).
The same is equally true about earned income and investment income. In fact, investment income has
often been aggregated under the umbrella of earned income, and more recently, the NCCS classifies
membership dues as a type of earned income. Again, the fact is that, earned income includes income
earned from the sale of mission and non-mission-related goods and services (in the form of fees and
funding from government contracts), as well as income generated from various other commercial
ventures and corporate partnerships (see James and Young 2006). On the other hand, investment
income includes interest, dividends, and capital gains generated from endowments and quasiendowments and the sale of assets (see Bowman et al. 2006). According to Mayer et al. (2012),
investment income is a uniquely independent resource, (p. 15), one whose generation is not
dependent on a nonprofits ability to market its goods and services while it is generated via different
channels. Aggregation therefore, masks these differences by discarding information (Fan and Zhang
2012; Orcutt et al. 1968).
This raises questions about the types and number of funding streams that are included in the
calculation of the revenue concentration index and whether the indices generated from such
calculations influence results. Studies of biological, ecological, and population systems recognize that
aggregation reduces the number of variables, which according to Sanz and Bravo de la Parra (1998),
ignores the internal structure of phenomenon under scrutiny. Such simplification overlooks the
possibility that the internal structure may have implications for everything else (Sanz and Bravo de la
Parra 1998), especially since variables aggregation reduces the dimensionality necessary for predicting
system dynamics (Shpak, Stadler, Wagner, and Hermisson 2004, 61). In the same logic, by aggregating
a nonprofits revenue stream that is, relying on three or four compared to eleven, thirteen, or nineteen
revenue streams in the construction of the revenue concentration index, the assumption one makes is
that the internal structure provides no additional information. Our simple demonstration below does
not support this assumption.
For example, organization A has three revenue streams, 𝑅𝑅1 = $1, 𝑅𝑅2 = $49, and 𝑅𝑅3 = $50, and
total revenue 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = $100. If we aggregate the first two revenue streams and then calculate a HHI
measure as the sum of the squared portion of total revenue, we would have HHI =

(($1 ? $49)/$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 = 0.50. Organization B also has three revenue streams, 𝑅𝑅1 =
$25, 𝑅𝑅2 = $25, and 𝑅𝑅3 = $50, and total revenue 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = $100. Using the aggregated approach to
calculate the HHI, we will have HHI = (($25 ? $25)/$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 = 0.50. We would
conclude that the two organizations are the same in terms of revenue concentration. Now let us use
the disaggregated approach to calculate the HHI. For organization A, the HHI = ($1/$100)2 ? ($49/
$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 = 0.490. For organization B, the HHI = ($25/$100)2 ? ($25/
$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 = 0.375. The disaggregated measure helps us to see that organization B has
a more diversified revenue strategy than organization A (where an HHI approaching 1 signifies
concentration). This example illustrates that information is lost during the aggregation process.
Apart from data limitations, revenue concentration indices have been calculated using five or fewer
funding streams, without necessarily providing much justification or argument for the aggregation. This
is where this research comes in, to test this assumption, in an effort to understand whether different
aggregated and disaggregated measures of revenue concentration result in significantly different
results. As Tuckman and Chang (1991) noted above, the HHI is designed to capture not only the
number of revenue sources, but also the level of dispersion amongst them. As Orcutt et al. (1968)
noted, aggregation can result in extreme loss of effective estimation and testing power, (773) giving us
reason to be concerned.
The current study also addresses which type of revenue sources may lead to more or less loss of
information when aggregated. To address this, we focus on three categories of revenue: contributions,
earned income, and investment income, primarily because these categories represent dominant
fundraising structures or models in the nonprofit sector (Carroll and Stater 2009; Hansmann 1980).
In addition, diversification in one’s revenue mixes and hence, resource dependence has been closely
linked to one’s mission. For example, testing Youngs (2006) normative theory of nonprofit finance,
Fischer et al. (2011) found that the more public a nonprofits services are, that is, services that are more
collective in nature and hence, exhibit nonrivalry and nonexclubility qualities, the more likely the
organization is to rely on donative income. The authors also found that nonprofits that generate a high
proportion of their revenue from earned income are those that produce private benefits, that is, goods
and services that can feasibly be sold on the marketplace without undermining nonprofit mission.
Furthermore, commercial nonprofits have been found to display more concentrated revenue streams
than donative nonprofits (Chang and Tuckman 1994). And compared to donative and earned income
categories, investment income is by far the most volatile (Mayer et al. 2012, 15).
Considering the relatively distinct nature of the three broad categories of revenue (contributions,
earned income, and investment income), it becomes an empirical question whether revenue sources
within each category are relatively more or less homogenous and whether this level of homogeneity
leads to relatively more or less information loss and thus measurement error within the HHI.

Data and Methods

As noted earlier, in researching whether revenue concentration promotes growth in nonprofits
financial capacity, Chikoto and Neely (2014) found discrepancies in the direction and magnitude of the
results across the three revenue concentration measures they employed (based on whether three,
four, or thirteen revenue sources were used). The authors inadvertently observed that the coefficients

on their measures of financial capacity increasingly became more positive as the HHI became more
comprehensive, suggesting that how one measures revenue concentration may alter the results.
Hence, this research is mainly concerned with how the HHI is measured and whether different
measurements yield significantly different results for predicting or estimating nonprofit financial
health1. Such an examination is crucial given the widespread acceptance and use of the HHI in
nonprofit research. As noted in the literature, nonprofit financial health is a two-dimensional concept
which includes financial stability and capacity (Bowman 2011; Miller 2001, 2003). With this distinction
in mind, this research explicitly tests whether different HHI measures produce significantly different
financial volatility and financial capacity growth estimates.
Using NCCS digitized 990 data (19982003), we employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to test whether
using aggregated measures (i.e., the three- or four-item revenue diversification measures) compared
to more comprehensive measures (i.e., the seven- or thirteen-item revenue diversification measures),
yield significantly different financial volatility and financial growth results. While the overall dataset
included 1,388,480 observations, we deleted 94,962 returns led for special conditions such as
termination, as well as dropped 34,183 group affiliated returns. We also deleted 14,755 observations
because they had a scal year-end change. We thus limited observations to have all variables necessary
to run the regressions.
Finally, we made sure that the sample was the same for both our financial volatility and financial
capacity tests, which limited the sample to 1 year of data (2003) due to the capacity growth measure
requiring five (5) years of data. As a result, our final sample had 103,701 observations representing
every National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) major code (A through Z).
Table 1 shows the distribution of nonprofits by the count of revenue sources for the year 2003.
Approximately, half of our sample collects income from more than four sources. And based on Table 2,
the three most common revenue sources for our sample are direct public support (75 %), interest on
investments (70 %), and program service revenue (65 %), which, respectively, reflects the three
commonly used nonprofit revenue classifications of donative, investment, and earned income.
Together, the results in Table 2 indicate that close to half of the organizations have some
diversification within the three revenue categories.
Although not surprising that many nonprofits have revenue diversification across these three revenue
streams, the majority of the nonprofits in our sample demonstrated a tendency to diversify within one
or more of these three streams. This provided us with an opportunity to test whether how we measure
revenue diversification has different implications for nonprofits dependent on different types of
funding models. Specifically, we performed the acid test using four scenarios. The first scenario
includes an acid test of whether diversification measurement yields different results across our full
sample of 103,701 nonprofits.
As noted in the literature, nonprofits are particularly subject to resource dependency (Carroll and
Stater 2009 p. 950), and reliance on any one revenue stream greatly influences its organizational
structure and financial health (Brooks 2002; Hodge and Piccolo 2005; Weisbrod 1998). As such, the
next three acid tests

Table 1 Number of nonprofits by the count of revenue streams
Number of revenue streams Number of nonprofits Percent of total Cumulative percent
1
5080
4.90
4.90
2
13,209
12.74
17.64
3
19,239
18.55
36.19
4
20,942
20.19
56.38
5
18,349
17.69
74.08
6
13,082
12.62
86.69
7
7790
7.51
94.20
8
3807
3.67
97.88
9
1548
1.49
99.37
10
510
0.49
99.86
11
115
0.11
99.97
12
28
0.03
100.00
13
2
0.00
100.00
Total
103,701
100.00
Table 2 Percentage of nonprofits by the type of revenue stream
Revenue stream
Percentage of nonprofits with source (%)
Direct public support
75
Indirect public support
20
Government grants
35
Program service revenue
65
Membership dues
24
Interest on investments
70
Dividends from securities
29
Other investment income
6
Net rental income‘
13
Net gain on sale of assets
12
net income from special events
31
Gross profit from sale of inventory
14
Other revenue
40
are based on three scenarios that reflect the nature of a nonprofit organizations resource-dependence,
that is, whether its funding sources are predominantly diversified within donative, earned, or
investment income.
First, Donative-dependent reflects nonprofits with at least two of the following sources: direct public
support, indirect public support, government grants, and/or net income from special events. In
addition, donative-dependent nonprofits must have fewer than two earned income revenue streams
and fewer than two investment income revenue streams. Second, Earned Income-dependent denotes
a subgroup of nonprofits with at least two of the following sources: program revenue, membership
dues, and/or other revenue. In addition, earned income-dependent nonprofits must have fewer than

two donative income revenue streams and fewer than two investment income revenue streams. And
finally, Investment Income-dependent contains a subgroup of nonprofits with at least two of the
following sources: interest and savings, other investment income, and/or net gain from sale of assets.
In addition, investment income-dependent nonprofits must have fewer than two donative income
revenue streams and fewer than two earned income revenue streams.

Dependent Variables

Our first dependent variable is a measure of revenue volatility consistent with Carroll and Stater
(2009). This is measured as the percentage of actual revenues deviated from predicted values.
Specifically the following fixed effects model is first run:

𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log of total revenue, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents a series of dummy variables for each organization,
and 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 represents a series of time dummy variables. The residual from the model 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , represents the
deviation of actual revenue from expected revenue. The predicted values from the model are then
obtained and divided by the absolute residuals to generate the measure for revenue volatility. We run
the model over all years of data in the dataset (1998-2003) and then use the results to obtain the
revenue volatility measure in 2003 and the prior revenue volatility measure (in 2002) for our final
sample.
Carroll and Staters (2009) iteration of financial volatility is therefore calculated on the basis of the
extent of the deviation between actual and expected revenue. Specifically, based on a revenue growth
trend regression model, volatility is estimated as the percent deviation of the actual gross revenue
from the expected revenue. According to the authors, this measure includes controls for fiscal years to
account for potential prior revenue volatility, in addition to accounting for the unique total revenue
growth trends for each organization. Our second dependent variable is similar to Chikoto and Neely
(2014) and is measured as the five-year percentage growth in total revenues from 1998 to 2003 (line
12 on the IRS 990 form).

Independent Variables

As indicated above, we model revenue diversification at four levels of aggregation; first, following
Carroll and Stater (2009), the most aggregated measure �RDAggregated � is based on three revenue
streams: contributions, investment income, and program revenue. Our second measure separates out
government grants and includes four revenue streams following Yan et al. (2009): contributions,
government grants, investment income, and program revenue (RDFourSource ). Our third measure is
based on seven revenue streams (RDSevenSource ) identified as the streams most common in our
sample: direct public support, government grants, program service revenue, interest on investments,
dividends from securities, net income from special events, and other revenues (see Table 2). For our
fourth measure, similar to Chikoto and Neely (2014), we include a comprehensive or disaggregated
measure �RDcomprehensive � which includes thirteen revenue streams.
These revenue streams are the break-down of the first line item and the other ten line items of the
revenues on the Form 9902 This comprehensive measure takes advantage of the richness of the
digitized data. The general form of the four measures is

𝑛𝑛

RD = �1 − �

Ri2 � / [(𝑛𝑛 − 1)/𝑛𝑛],

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the ratio of the revenue stream to total revenue; and 𝑛𝑛 is the number of revenue streams,
which is 3, 4, 7, or 13 depending on the measure. This RD measure, a variation of HHI (i.e., RD = (1 −
HHI)/[(𝑛𝑛 − 1)/𝑛𝑛)]), is widely used in nonprofit studies (e.g., Carroll and Stater 2009; Yan et al.
2009). It is interpreted as follows: the higher the value of RD, the greater the level of revenue
diversification3
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our four HHI measures, as well as our two dependent
variables; financial volatility and financial capacity growth. We observe differences in means across the
four revenue diversification indices, with a greater dispersion across the medians. Consistent with
expectations, the mean and median values of the indices are higher for the level of disaggregation
(RDAggregated is the smallest with the largest value observed in RDComprehensive). In addition, the
revenue volatility mean percentage of 2.1 % is similar to the 2.49 % reported in Carroll and Stater
(2009).
Table 3 also demonstrates that 24 % of the nonprofits had revenue diversity only within donative
streams, 16 % of the nonprofits had revenue diversity only within earned revenue streams, with 4 % of
the sample having revenue diversity only within investment-based revenue sources. This suggests that
inferences derived from using the three source aggregation measure will provide less value to
approximately 44 % of the organizations. A significant number of organizations could gain more
insights when a revenue diversification measure looks into the details of the revenue sources.

Control Variables

In all financial volatility models, we control for similar variables utilized in the literature, in particular,
Carroll and Stater (2009). These include prior financial volatility, organizational size (measured by total
expenses), administrative and fundraising efficiency (measured as the ratio of administrative expenses
to total expenses and fundraising expenses to total expenses, respectively), debt margin (total yearend liabilities divided by total year-end assets), total margin (net surplus or deficit divided by total
revenue), retained earnings (measured by net assets), age, and whether an organization was donative
or not (whether the ratio of donations to total revenue is greater than 50 % or not). The controls for
prior financial volatility and size are both found by Carroll and Stater (2009) to be significant and are
therefore included in our model.
Administrative and fundraising efficiency are included as it is expected that organizations that are less
efficient are more financially troubled and are therefore more likely to experience greater financial
volatility (Keating et al. 2005). Debt and total margins are included to control for the level of financial
flexibility. Organizations that are more financially flexible are expected to be less financially volatile.
Retained earnings are also included in the model since organizations with more retained earnings are
expected to be financially healthier and thus experience less revenue volatility. In addition, we control
for the age of the organization as we expect older organizations to be more revenue stable and thus
less volatile. Recognizing that different revenue types behave differently and that organizations’
missions and geography often drive choices in revenue types, we also control for organizational sector
or field, location, and whether an organization is primarily donative.

Table 3 Summary statistics for variables of interest
Variable
RDAggregated

Mean Median Sd
Min Max N
0.31
0.23 0.29 0.00 0.99 103,701

RDFourSource
0.33
0.29 0.28 0.00 0.99 103,701
RDSevenSource
0.35
0.35 0.26 0.00 0.97 103,701
RDComprehensive
0.35
0.36 0.26 0.00 0.93 103,701
Voltperc
0.02
0.01 0.03 0.00 0.65 103,701
fiveyrg_totalrev
0.82
0.25 22.5 -0.99 5,573 103,701
Donative-dependent
0.24
0.00 0.43
0
1 103,701
Earned income-dependent
0.16
0.00 0.36
0
1 103,701
Investment Income- dependent
0.04
0.00 0.18
0
1 103,701
Paired T tests reveal that the differences between RDaggregated and RDComprehensive are statistically
different at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Donative-dependent is defined as ‘‘1’’ if the organization has at least two of the following
sources: direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and/or net income from special
events. In addition the organization has one or zero earned income sources and one or zero investment income
source. Earned Income-dependent is defined as ‘‘1’’ if the organization has at least two of the following sources:
program revenue, membership dues, and/or other revenue. In addition the organization has one or zero
donative income sources and one or zero investment income source. Investment Income-dependent is defined
as ‘‘1’’ if the organization has at least two of the following sources: interest and savings, other investment
income, and/or net gain from sale of assets. In addition the organization has one or zero donative sources and
one or zero earned income sources

For the financial capacity models, consistent with Chikoto and Neely (2014), we control for total
revenue, fundraising and administrative efficiency, the age of the organization, the ratio of executive
compensation to total compensation, whether an organization is primarily donative, as well as include
controls for organization type and location. All independent variables for the financial capacity models
are measured for the year 1998, since this is the base year for our dependent variable. Total revenue is
included as a control in recognition that revenue growth rates are dependent in part on starting levels
of revenue. Fundraising and administrative efficiency are included as we expect more efficient
organizations to experience higher growth rates. Age is included in the model as we expect more
mature organizations to have a slower rate of growth. We also control for the relative amount of the
budget spent on executive compensation as we expect that organizations run by a relatively more
professional executive team will experience higher growth rates. Finally, in recognition that revenue
types can be expected to have different growth rates, and that mission and location often drive the
choice of revenues, we also include controls for whether an organization is primarily donative, the
organizations sector, and the organizations state of location.

OLS Regression Results

Table 4 provides a summary of our regression results, and Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in the
Appendix provide results for the detailed regression models.
First, our models using the full sample - in predicting financial stability - show statistically insignificant
results which are inconsistent with Carroll and Staters (2009) general findings that increasing ones level
of revenue diversification reduces financial volatility and hence contributes to the financial stability of
the organization. Our results show that the level of revenue diversification is not associated with the

level of financial volatility. However, when assessing whether revenue concentration is associated with
nonprofit financial growth, our results fully demonstrate the impact of information loss through
aggregation. In this case, only the disaggregated measures (seven or thirteen sources) of revenue
diversification yield statistically significant results4 compared to relying on the aggregated (three or
four sources) HHI measure.
Pertinent to our research, the results in Table 4 demonstrate the impact of information content
between our diversification measures, with the disaggregated measures (RDSevenSource or
RDComprehensive) capturing more detailed diversification information than the aggregated measures
(RDAggregated or RDFourSource). Restricting our analysis to the three subsamples of nonprofits
dependent on donative, earned, and investment income, respectively, yields revealing results on the
impact of information loss due to aggregation. Recall that donative income-dependent nonprofits
denote a subgroup of nonprofits dependent on at least two or more of the following sources: direct
public support, indirect public support, government grants, and/or net income from special events,
with fewer than two earned or investment income sources. In the same vein, earned incomedependent nonprofits predominantly rely on at least two of the following sources: program revenue,
membership dues, and/or other revenue, with the investment income-dependent subgroup relying on
at least two or more of the following sources: interest and savings, other investment income, and/or
net gain from sale of assets, and less on the others streams.

Impact on Financial Volatility

First, when dealing with predominantly donative income-dependent nonprofits, the comprehensive
measure does not support a diversification strategy when trying to reduce financial volatility. The
results in Table 4 show that while using the most aggregated diversification measure yields statistically
significant results, using four, seven, or thirteen sources results in statistically insignificant findings.
(For additional detail, also see Table 7). This suggests that using an aggregated measure overstates
results, leading one to conclude that there is a relationship between revenue diversification and
financial volatility when no relationship exists.
Second, isolating the analysis only to earned income-dependent and investment income-dependent
nonprofits, respectively, seem to confirm the first point above. The magnitude of the relationship is
demonstrably understated (0.061 compared to 0.179 and -0.064 compared to 0.258, respectively,
between the least and most aggregated HHI measures). In the case of investment income-dependent
nonprofits, the direction of the relationship between revenue diversification and financial volatility not
only changes, the results also become statistically significant. In fact, our comprehensive measure
results suggest that increasing diversification within earned income or investment income increases
financial volatility (For additional detail, also see Tables 8, 9). Our results are different from - Mayer et
al.’s finding which focuses on the diversification cross the donative, earned, and investment income;
instead, our results show the additional insights gained from looking into the details of the three
income categories.

Impact on Financial Capacity

A similar story is also observed when assessing the impact of revenue concentration on nonprofit
financial growth. As demonstrated in Table 4 (For additional detail, also see Tables 10, 11, 12), using an

aggregated revenue diversification measure would lead us to conclude that there is no relationship
between revenue concentration and financial capacity growth (as shown in the full model and when
isolating the analysis only to investment income-dependent nonprofits). However, the results from the
more disaggregated measures (RDSevenSource or RDComprehensive) tell a different story, one that is
consistent with Chikoto and Neelys (2014) findings.

In addition, focusing on the subsample of donative- and earned income-dependent nonprofits, we also
observe noteworthy differences in the magnitude of the coefficients, thus further displaying the
impact of information loss through aggregation. In two scenarios we observe that the aggregated
revenue diversification measure understates
Table 4 Summary OLS results predicting financial volatility & financial capacity growth
RDAggregated
-0.009
0.063*
0.006
-0.023
RDFourSource
0.026
-0.006
RDSevenSource
RDComprehensive
0.015
-0.050
Dependent variable: 5-year revenue growth
RDAggregated
0.004 -0.066***
-0.006 -0.096***
RDFourSource
-0.077*** -0.149***
RDSevenSource
RDComprehensive
-0.074*** -0.159***
All models include robust standard errors
* p\0.05, ** p\0.01, *** p\0.001

0.061*
0.217***
0.146***
0.179***

-0.064
0.057
0.230**
0.258**

-0.104***
0.030
-0.167***
-0.050
-0.168*** -0.399***
-0.201*** -0.450***

the magnitude of financial growth when nonprofits concentrate their revenues streams (6.6 %
compared to 15.9 % growth for donative-dependent nonprofits, and 10.4 % compared to 20.1 %
growth for earned income-dependent nonprofits).

Discussion and Conclusion

Generally, the nature of nonprofit financial data has inadvertently predisposed nonprofit researchers
to how to construct the revenue concentration index. Limited data on revenue streams meant the
adoption of more aggregated measures of revenue concentration. However, the degree to which this
impacted the results remained hitherto an unexplored or unquestioned issue. Building on Chikoto and
Neelys (2014) suspicions, our results suggest that a loss of information occurs through aggregation and
this in turn affects estimation results in important ways. Researchers and nonprofits are thus
encouraged to evaluate the importance of the additional information disaggregated measures provide,
in order to capture a more accurate picture of revenue diversification (concentration) and its potency
as a strategy for financial health (growth).
Overall, the preceding results demonstrate a number of issues that have implications for research
utilizing the revenue concentration index. First, based on the results from the full sample, how the
revenue diversification index is constructed not only might result in divergent results, it may also
influence whether results are significant or not, as demonstrated in our test for financial growth.

Hence, merely relying on the aggregated measure would result in a verdict of no relationship between
revenue concentration and financial capacity growth.
Second, if the theory of information loss due to aggregation is correct, then our results suggest that
using aggregated measures of revenue diversification may misstate the magnitude and/or statistical
significance of the findings as scenarios changes. While utilizing, our full sample demonstrates a
modest impact of information loss, especially in the financial volatility model; breaking up our sample
of nonprofits by their resource-dependence yielded results that allowed us a better understanding of
the impact of information loss through aggregation. Hence, it becomes important for researchers to be
well-acquainted with their data and the character of their sample of study. An ancillary benefit here
may be the need to also be cognizant of the nature of revenue diversification among different
nonprofit organizations as suggested by Young (2006) and others.
With respect to the primary objective of this research, our results demonstrate that, revenue
diversification measurement matters, that is, how one aggregates revenue streams in the calculation
of the HHI, influences the direction and significance levels of ones estimates. In all, we believe there
are important lessons here for nonprofit researchers, which brings us to our third observation; where
magnitudes are important, caution should be exercised when interpreting results when using
aggregated measures of revenue.
Granted, due to cost restrictions, researchers have to choose between existing datasets with
aggregated revenues or having to spend money to purchase more disaggregated data, or spend
substantial number of hours hand collecting data. In light of the nature of the data available to
researchers, work still needs to be done in establishing greater data specificity and in reclassifying data
to capturing all, new, and different forms of revenue (Chang and Tuckman 2010). Finally, researchers
and nonprofits need to be cautious when advocating a revenue diversification strategy. As shown
above, when a nonprofit goes after diversification within a revenue stream (e.g., donative versus
investment income), it may not get the normally believed results of lower revenue volatility.
In general, aggregation forces otherwise nuanced revenue sources into a few revenue streams, thus
resulting in important information loss, which in turn impacts results in regression analyses of variables
of interest. Overall, this research supports the observation in the literature that different funding
streams behave differently and they generate different consequences on nonprofits behavior. We nd
that disaggregated measures respect this internal structure.

Appendix
Variable Denitions
laglnvoltperc
laglnexpenses
lRDAggregated
lRDFourSource
lRDSevenSource
lRDComprehensive
ladmineff
lage

Lag of the natural log of volatility percentage
Lag of the natural log of total expenses
Lag of the HHI measure with three aggregated sources
Lag of the HHI measure with four aggregated sources
Lag of the HHI measure with seven aggregated sources
Lag of the HHI measure with thirteen sources
Lag of the ratio of administrative expenses to total expenses
Lag of age defined as the current fiscal year minus the ruling year

lfundeff
laglnnetassets
ltotalmargin
ldebtmargin
donative
donative98
revenue98
adminexpratio98
age98
frexpratio98
compratio98
RDAggregated−98
RDFourSource−98
RDSevenSource−98
RDComprehensive−98

Lag of the ratio of fundraising expenses to total expenses
Lag of the natural log of total net assets
Lag of the ratio of excess(deficit) income divided by total revenue
Lag of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
1 if the ratio of donations to total revenue is greater than 50 %
1 if the ratio of donations to total revenue is greater than 50 % in 1998
Total revenues in 1998
Ratio of administrative expenses to total expenses in 1998
1998 Age (fiscal year–ruling year)
Ratio of fundraising expenses to total expenses in 1998
=Ratio of officer compensation to total expenses in 1998
1998 HHI measure with three aggregated sources
1998 HHI measure with four aggregated sources
1998 HHI measure with seven aggregated sources
1998 HHI measure with thirteen sources

Additional controls dummy variables for state of location and NTEE Major GroupCode (A to Z)
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
Table 5 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
laglnvoltperc
0.350***
0.350***
0.350***
0.350***
laglnexpenses
-0.134*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133***
ladmineff
0.057**
0.057**
0.054**
0.055**
lage
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
lfundeff
0.153***
0.152***
0.150***
0.151***
laglnnetassets
0.060***
0.060***
0.059***
0.059***
ltotalmargin
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
ldebtmargin
0.107***
0.107***
0.106***
0.107***
donative
0.110***
0.109***
0.108***
0.109***
-0.009
lRDAggregated
lRDFourSource
0.006
lRDSevenSource
0.026
lRDComprehensive
0.015
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
-1.793*** -1.797*** -1.805*** -1.801***
N
103,701
103,701
103,701
103,701
adj. R2
0.243
0.243
0.243
0.243
All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that have a
Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers until the
median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See StataCorp
(2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 6 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth
revenue98

(1)

0.000

(2)

0.000

(3)

0.000

(4)

0.000

adminexpratio98
-0.075*** -0.073*** -0.059*** -0.060***
age98
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
frexpratio98
-0.368*** -0.367*** -0.354*** -0.356***
compratio98
0.122*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.126***
donative98
0.015*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019***
RDAggregated−98
0.004
RDFourSource−98
-0.006
RDSevenSource−98
-0.077***
RDComprehensive−98
-0.078***
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
0.313*** 0.316*** 0.340*** 0.339***
N
103,701
103,701
103,701
103,701
adj. R2
0.029
0.029
0.030
0.030
All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that have a
Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers until the
median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See Statacorp
(2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001

Table 7 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage as the dependent variable and
organizations with At least 2 donative funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and
investment funding sources
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
laglnvoltperc
0.315***
0.314***
0.315***
0.314***
laglnexpenses
-0.127*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.131***
lRDAggregated
0.063*
lRDFourSource
-0.023
-0.006
lRDSevenSource
lRDComprehensive
-0.050
ladmineff
0.014
0.014
0.012
0.016
lage
-0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
lfundeff
0.251**
0.243**
0.249**
0.249**
laglnnetassets
0.050***
0.052***
0.052***
0.053***
ltotalmargin
-0.005
-0.005
-0.005
-0.005
ldebtmargin
0.169***
0.171***
0.171***
0.170***
donative
0.166***
0.153***
0.153***
0.155***
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
-2.047*** -2.013*** -2.020*** -1.993***
N
25,175
25,175
25,175
25,175
2
adj. R
0.202
0.202
0.202
0.202
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 8 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage as the dependent variable and
organizations with at least 2 earned funding sources and fewer than 2 donative income and investment
funding sources
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
laglnvoltperc
0.372***
0.370***
0.372***
0.371***
laglnexpenses
-0.087*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.080***
lRDAggregated
0.061*
lRDFourSource
0.217***
lRDSevenSource
0.146***
lRDComprehensive
0.179***
ladmineff
0.089
0.048
0.063
0.055
lage
-0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
lfundeff
0.161
0.116
0.149
0.143
laglnnetassets
0.031***
0.026***
0.030***
0.028***
ltotalmargin
-0.007
-0.008
-0.007
-0.007
ldebtmargin
0.069*
0.061
0.069*
0.067*
donative
0.147***
0.120***
0.149***
0.149***
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
-1.934*** -1.953*** -1.983*** -2.018***
N
16,298
16,298
16,298
16,298
adj. R2
0.241
0.242
0.241
0.242
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 9 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage as the dependent variable and
organizations with at least 2 investment funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and donative
funding sources
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
laglnvoltperc
0.306***
0.307***
0.307***
0.306***
laglnexpenses
-0.153*** -0.151*** -0.141*** -0.140***
lRDAggregated
0.064
lRDFourSource
0.057
lRDSevenSource
0.230**
lRDComprehensive
0.258**
laglnnetassets
0.074***
0.071***
0.061***
0.060***
ltotalmargin
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
ldebtmargin
-0.049
-0.047
-0.039
-0.043
donative
0.041
0.032
0.037
0.040
Additional Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
-1.967*** -1.995*** -2.086*** -2.097***
N
3,603
3,603
3,603
3,603

adj. R2

0.261

0.261

0.263

0.263

Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 10 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth as the dependent variable and organizations
with at least 2 donative funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and investment funding
sources
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

revenue98
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
adminexpratio98
-0.103*** -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.083***
age98
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
frexpratio98
-0.502**** -0.511*** -0.483*** -0.486***
compratio98
0.255***
0.262***
0.262***
0.268***
donative98
-0.009
0.006
0.012
0.013
RDAggregated−98
-0.066***
RDFourSource−98
-0.096***
RDSevenSource−98
-0.149***
RDComprehensive−98
-0.159***
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
0.430***
0.434***
0.445***
0.448***
N
25,175
25,175
25,175
25,175
adj. R2
0.034
0.035
0.037
0.037
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 11 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth as the dependent variable and organizations
with at least 2 earned funding sources and fewer than 2 donative income and investment funding
sources
revenue98
adminexpratio98
age98
frexpratio98
compratio98
donative98

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.000
-0.034
-0.002***
-0.452***
0.108*
-0.045***

0.000
-0.003
-0.002***
-0.422***
0.124**
-0.028**

0.000
-0.008
-0.002***
-0.441***
0.112*
-0.048***

0.000
-0.001
-0.002***
-0.436***
0.108*
-0.048***

RDAggregated−98
-0.104***
RDFourSource−98
-0.167***
RDSevenSource−98
-0.168***
RDComprehensive−98
-0.201***
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
0.203**
0.195**
0.222***
0.234***
N
16,298
16,298
16,298
16,298
adj. R2
0.028
0.031
0.031
0.032
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 12 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth as the dependent variable and organizations
with at least 2 investment funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and donative funding
sources
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
revenue98
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
adminexpratio98
-0.095*
-0.094*
-0.089*
-0.086*
age98
-0.000
-0.000
0.001
0.001
frexpratio98
0.100
0.109
0.137
0.139
compratio98
-0.123
-0.142
-0.129
-0.127
donative98
0.078** 0.083***
0.044
0.035
RDAggregated−98
0.030
RDFourSource−98
-0.050
RDSevenSource−98
-0.399***
RDComprehensive−98
-0.450***
Additional controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
_cons
0.225
0.264
0.413
0.437
N
3,603
3,603
3,603
3,603
adj. R2
0.036
0.037
0.058
0.061
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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